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NICK JOHNSTONE'

International Trade, Transfrontier
Pollution, and Environmental
Cooperation: A Case Study of The
Mexican-American Border Region
ABSTRACT
Although some theoreticalwork has been conducted on the interdependence of international trade and the transfrontier diffusion of
pollution, empirical analyses of the potential importance of such
interdependencehave not been conducted. This paper attempts to do
so in the context of the Mexican-American Border Region. As will
be demonstrated,the characteristicsof production in the region and
the specific geographical context make the interdependence of these
two processes increasinglysignificant.As such, it must be taken into
account in any binational cooperative attempt to address the
problems of environmental degradationin the region.
INTRODUCTION
Although some theoretical work has been conducted on the interdependence of international trade and the transfrontier diffusion of
pollution, empirical analyses of the potential importance of such
interdependence have not been conducted.' This paper attempts to
undertake such an analysis in the context of the Mexican-American
Border Region. As will be demonstrated, both the characteristics of
production in the region and the specific geographical context make the
interdependence of these two processes increasingly significant. Moreover, this interdependence must be recognized and taken into account in
any binational attempt to address the problems of environmental
degradation in the region. 2 Section I is a brief discussion of the potential
* Research Officer at the Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge.
1. For discussions of the theoretical interdependence of the two phenomena, see John D.
Merrifield, The Impact of Selected Abatement Strategies on TransnationalPollution, the Terms of
Trade, and Factor Rewards: A General Equilibrium Approach, 15 J.ENVTL. ECON. & MGm. 259
(1988); Michael Rauscher, Foreign Trade and the Environment, in ENVIRONMENTAL SCARCITY:
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION 17-31 (Horst Siebert ed., 1991).

2. It should be noted, however, that although the characteristics of the border region (i.e.
the prevalence of international production-sharing arrangements and the close integration
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importance of the role of the environment as a determinant of trade and
investment patterns and the means by which such tendencies are affected
by transfrontier pollution. Section Il is concerned with the relative extent
and cost effects of transfrontier pollution in the region. Section III outlines
the theory of binational environmental cooperation. Finally, Section IV
discusses the nature of binational agreements in the region and the means
by which such agreements may contribute to continued environmental
degradation.
I.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

According to classical trade theory, a country will specialize in
the production and export of a commodity which is relatively more
intensive in the use of factors of production in which it possesses a
relative abundance. The theory of environmentally-determined comparative advantage is merely an extension of this theory in the sense that
the environment is introduced as a factor of production, analogous to the
classical factors of production, labour and capital. In what sense might
the environment be considered a factor of production? On the one hand,
natural resources could be used directly either in processed form or as
inputs in the production of other goods. For example, the exploitation of
non-renewable natural resources (minerals, fossil fuels, etc...) has a direct
effect on the available stock of such resources for future use. In addition,
a harvest rate of renewable natural resources (forests, marine species,
etc...) which exceeds the resource's natural growth rate will also reduce
the stock of natural capital available for future use. Less obviously, but
analogously, the environment can be considered a factor of production
through the use of its capacity to absorb and assimilate the waste arising
from production processes. To the extent that a body of water is able to
render a limited concentration of industrial pollutants benign, for
example, the production process that generates the wastewater flow uses
the river's assimilative capacity. A similar point can be made with respect
to climatic patterns which disperse air pollutants sufficiently to obviate
adverse environmental effects. However, as is the case with the use of
renewable resources as inputs in production, this capacity can be
of transborder ecological systems) are likely to result in particularly acute relations of
international economic and environmental interdependence, the findings of this study are
by no means specific to this case study. As long as there are close relations of economic
interdependence in pollution-intensive sectors and there are significant disjunctures between
such production and its effects on the domestic environment the theoretical and empirical
findings of this study have a relevance beyond the border region. And since production
processes are increasingly international in nature and there is no reason to expect the
geographic extent of political jurisdictions to be the same as the geographic extent of environmental systems, such relevance is likely to be widespread.
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exceeded such that there is a permanent loss in the capacity of the
environmental medium to process future streams of waste. In both cases
there is a negative relationship between the use of the environment as a
factor of production and the stock of natural capital. Irrespective whether
a firm exploits natural resources or produces pollution-intensive goods,
the firm's output embodies significant amounts of natural capital. In this
sense, a factory that pollutes a body of water, destroying fish stocks, is
no different from a fishery which over-exploits the species, rendering it
extinct. The manufactures produced by the factory embody the river's
natural capital no less than the fishery's output.
Although the environment can, in some sense, be considered a
factor of production, analogous to physical capital and labour, it
possesses special characteristics which discourage scarcity effects from
being fully reflected in price changes. Why is this case? On the one hand,
the reason why the environment is not priced appropriately is partly a
result of the common property nature of rights to many environmental
resources used in production processes. Since the environmental
endowment from which natural capital is drawn is often held in
common, there may not be a negative relationship between increased
exploitation and the price of the resource since a property regime which
can transmit the appropriate price signals does not exist. In addition, the
environment possesses economic value as a source of environmental
quality and not only as a factor of production. The subjective valuation
that a society places on environmental quality might be the result of
value attached to the environment for recreational purposes (consumptive
use value), aesthetic reasons (non-consumptive use value), or even merely
due to awareness of its very being (existence value).3 However, in its
capacity as a source of environmental quality the environment may be
considered a pure public good in the sense that individual consumption
does not result in increased scarcity. As such, the cost associated with the
use of the environment as a source of environmental quality and natural
capital is not expressed fully in the market since increased use may not
increase prices. Instead, the economic cost to the firm usually manifests
itself, at least in part, through regulation related to the preservation of
natural capital and environmental quality.
The price associated with the use of the environment as a factor
of production, therefore, is a reflection of environmental endowments,
social preferences for the environment, and the extent to which the state
reflects such endowments and preferences in appropriate regulations. As
3. For more on the valuation of the environment, see Maynard M. Hufschmidt et al.,
ENVIRONMENT, NATURAL SYSTEMS AND DEVELOPMENT: AN EcONOMIC VALUATION GUIDE

(1983) and Per-Olov Johansson, THE EcONOMIc THEORY AND MEASUREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFTS (1987).
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such, there may be significant differences across countries in the price
attached to the use of environment as a factor of production. These
differences should affect trade and investment patterns in the same way
as differences in labour costs or capital costs. A number of empirical
studies have been conducted in the past in order to determine the relative
importance of such effects.4 For the most part such studies have not
uncovered significant evidence of environmentally-determined territorial
restructuring of production. In addition, two studies of the Mexican-American trade relationship have been conducted. In an ex ante study Low
(1992), analyzed the effects of a pollution abatement cost equalization tax
on Mexican exports to the United States. Under special assumptions
(infinitely elastic export supply elasticities and full abatement cost
equalization), a two percent contraction in export earnings was estimated.5 In an ex post, study Grossman and Krueger undertook a cross-section
analysis of the determinants of manufactured imports from Mexico into
the United States. Only two of the six specifications had statistically
significant results for the "environment" variable (American abatement
costs), but they were of the unexpected (negative) sign.6
The empirical evidence of environmentally-determined trade
effects in the region, therefore, is quite limited. Part of the reason can
certainly be attributed to the fact that the cross-sectional methodology
used implicitly assumes that sectors with the heaviest pollution abatement and control expenditures will be those sectors which are most
adversely affected by environmental regulations in terms of competitive
displacement. However, since most such sectors (chemicals, basic metals,
processed metals, pulp and paper) possess structural characteristics (i.e.
demand and supply elasticities, input-output linkages, et cetera) which
discourage territorial restructuring of production, cross-sectional studies
and studies which concentrate on the most pollution-intensive sectors
may not be an appropriate means of testing such hypotheses. Moreover,
such studies tend to emphasize regulatory costs of production associated
with the use of the environment at the expense of non-regulatory

4. See James A. Tobey, The Effects of Donestic Environental Policies on Patterns of World
Trade, 43 KYKLOS 191 (1990); T. J. Bartik, The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Business
Location in the United States, 19 GROWTH & CHANGE 22 (1988); Virginia D. McConnell &
Robert M. Schwab, The Impact of Environmental Regulation on Industry Location Decisions: The
Motor Vehicle Industry, 66 LAND ECON. 67 (1990); R. E. Lucas et al., Economic Development,
Environmental Regulation, and the International Migration of Toxic Industrial Pollution:
1960-1988 (1992) (prepared as background paper for the World Development Report 1992).
5. P. Low, Trade Measures and Environmental Quality: The Implications for Mexico's Exports,
in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 105-20 (World Bank Discussion Paper No.
159).
6. G. M. Grossman & A. B. Krueger, Environmental inpacts of a North American Free Trade
Agreement (April 1992) (Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 644).
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environment-related production costs. Among other costs, user charges
associated with the use of environment-related public infrastructure, the
potential magnitude of significant liability settlements arising from
environmental damages, and restrictions related to urban planning
regimes and land use controls may be of some significance. Such factors
are particularly important for the Border Region since ex post liability
regimes, public infrastructure finance mechanisms, and land use control
institutions and objectives are so different on the two sides of the border.
There is, however, a more fundamental issue which must be
raised. The preceding discussion implicitly assumes that goods which
embody natural capital are mobile across countries through trade, but
that the environment itself is not mobile across countries. Thus, it is
assumed that the relationship between the use of domestic environmental
factors of production, the domestic endowment of such resources, and the
cost associated with their use is determined locally. However, in the
presence of transfrontier pollution such an assumption is invalid. There
is a disjuncture between domestic production of pollution-intensive goods
and changes in the environmental endowment. Therefore, if rates of
diffusion of transfrontier pollution and/or differences in cost sensitivity
of environmental regimes to increased scarcity are significant, classic
comparative advantage effects arising from changes in resources may be
undermined or even reversed. Equilibrium may only be attained once
significant environmental degradation has taken place. The importance
of such effects are increased the greater the degree of economic and
environmental interdependence. As such, the United States-Mexico
Border Region, which is characterized by a preponderance of vertically-integrated production-sharing arrangements 7 and close ecological
interdependence is particularly vulnerable.
II. THE TRANSFRONTIER DIFFUSION OF POLLUTION IN THE
BORDER REGION
The discussion above implies that the diffusion of transfrontier
pollution may have significant effects on the territorial pattern of
production, particularly for sectors wherein comparative advantage is
determined, at least in part, by environmental factors. The next question
which must be addressed is whether or not there is significant evidence

7. See Jorge Bustamente, Maquiladoras:A New Face of InteniationalCapitalism onl Mexico's
Northern Frontier, in WOMEN, MEN AND THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR 224-56
(June Nash & Maria Patricia Fernandez-Kelly eds., 1983); Leslie Sklair, ASSEMBLING FOR
DEVELOPMENT: THE MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY IN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES (1989); LAS
MAQUILADORAS: AJUSTE ESTRUCTURAL Y DESARROLLO REGIONAL (B. Gonzalez-Arechiga & R.

Barajas Escamilla eds., 1989).
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of such transfrontier diffusion pollution in the United States-Mexico
Border Region. As such, a brief discussion of the region's topography;
hydrography, and meteorology is required before proceeding to a more
detailed discussion of the primary media of transfrontier pollution
diffusion!
The climate of the entire border region is very dry, with a
gradual progression from semiarid steppe near the Gulf of Mexico in the
East to the arid Sonora Desert in the West. For the most part prevailing
winds tend to blow from west to east, however this depends upon
specific regional characteristics. Topographically, the border itself is
artificial, intersected by a series of parallel discontinuous mountain chains
running north-south (the Sierra Madre Oriental and Occidental, the
Sangre de Cristo, the San Juan Mountains, the San Gabriel Mountains, et
cetera). Hydrologically, the frontier is also artificial, with drainage basins
criss-crossing much of the border. The Rio Grande does, however, form
the border for 1,244 miles of its length. The other major river, the
Colorado, runs from north to south and empties into the Baja de
California, while a number of smaller rivers-the San Pedro, the Tia
Juana-run south to north. Finally, there are a number of aquifers
crossing the international border, particularly in the central region. 9
TransfrontierDiffitsion of Air Pollution
Transfrontier diffusion of air pollution in the border region has
been of significant concern for some time. In particular, area sources of
emissions include agricultural production in the more arid regions which
tend to generate particulates, the use of vehicles which generate carbon
monoxide, nitrous oxides and hydrocarbons, the existence of unpaved
roads which result in particulate emissions, and residential burning
which generates carbon monoxide and particulate matter. Point sources
are also numerous. For instance, sulphur emissions from copper smelters
in sulphur dioxide the so-called binational "Grey Triangle" of Douglas
(Arizona), Cananea (Sonora), and Nacozari (Sonora) were a source of
much tension in the past. The American plant at Douglas is the oldest in
the United States, while the two plants in Mexico are also significant
sources of binational pollution. Indeed, Cochise County, where Douglas
is located just over the border from the two Sonora plants, exceeded the

8. The discussion is necessarily cursory. A full discussion would, of course, require a
comprehensive materials balance analysis of economy-environment interactions in the
Border Region.
9. For a discussion of the geography of the Border Region, see Section IIof BORDERLANDS
SOURCEBOOK: A GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE ON NORTHERN MEXICO AND THE AMERICAN

SOUTHWEST (Ellwyn R. Stoddard et al. eds., 1983).
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PM-10 NAAQS, one of the few rural counties in the region to do so.
Other incidences of point source transfrontier air pollution diffusion have
been noted in the Lower Rio Grande Valley, Douglas-Agua Prieta,
Nogales-Nogales, and Calexico-Mexicali. However, the two major
transborder conurbations - Tijuana-San Diego and Ciudad Juarez-El Paso
- have been of particular concern since in both cases two major industrialized cities share the same air basins.' 0
In the case of Ciudad Juarez-EI Paso the two cities are entirely
interdependent with respect to air quality, being located in a valley
running along the Rio Grande with mountains to the north and south.
Although air circulation within the basin is restricted, air moves back and
forth across the border a number of times during the course of a given
day. With respect to pollution, the effects of environmental interdependence are exacerbated by the frequency of atmospheric inversions in the
air shed due to topographical and meteorological conditions. One
commentator described the air shed as "one of the most polluted on the
continent". Not surprisingly, pollutants emitted from either side of the
border have tended to reflect the respective stages of development. In the
past, emissions of particulate matter and carbon monoxide from
residential burning of scraps, cardboard and even tires have been a
source of transfrontier pollution emissions from Juarez. In addition,
particulate matter from unpaved roads and cement plants have been
problematic. In 1974 the mean of particulate concentrations in El Paso
was. 139 pg/m 3, while the figure for Juarez was 342 pg/m 3 . While
American emissions have dropped drastically, PM-10 levels in downtown
Juarez continue to exceed 300 pg/m 3, compared to a 24-hour EPA
NAAQS of 150.11
More recently, many of the problems in Juarez related to vehicle
emissions. It has been asserted that over the course of a ten-year period,

10. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SUMMARY: ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR
THE MEXICAN-UNITED STATES BORDER AREA, FIRST STAGE 1992-1994 (1992); C. Richard Bath,
Environmental Issues in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands, 1 J. BORDERLANDS STUDIES 49 (1986);
Stephen P. Mumme, Complex Interdependence and Hazardous Waste Management along the
U.S.-Mexico Border, in DIMENSIONS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE POLITICS AND POLICY (Charles F.
Davis & James P. Lester eds., 1988); U.S. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USOTR), REVIEW OF UNITED STATES-MEXICO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1992); Howard G.
Applegate, Transnational Air Pollution, in ECOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE BORDER
REGION 127-37 (Stanley R. Ross ed., 1983).
11. See C. Richard Bath & Victoria Rodriguez, Comparative and Binational Air Pollution

Policy in El Paso, Texas and CiudadJuarez, Chiihualua, 6 BORDERLANDS 171 (1983); Applegate,
supra note 10; C. Richard Bath, Health and Environmental Problems: The Role of the Border in
El Paso-Ciudad Juarez Coordination, 24 J.INTER-AM. STUD. 375 (1982); C. Richard Bath, Environmental Issues in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands, I J.BORDERLAND STUD. 49 (1986); USOTR, supra
note 10.
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although El Paso has been, and continues to be, an EPA non-attainment
zone for carbon monoxide, El Paso emissions in themselves have never
been sufficient to be solely responsible such a designation: Vehicle
emissions from both cities have been required. With the introduction of
a vehicle emissions inspection programme in 1991 significant tampering
with air pollution devices on the vehicle fleet was revealed. Moreover,
the average age of the vehicle fleet in Juarez is approximately double that
of El Paso. Ironically, the border itself is a significant contributor to such
emissions due to queues at border crossings. In addition, industrial
sources have also been a subject of some binational concern. PM-10 levels
are particularly high in regions where there are significant amounts of
heavy industry in Juarez. More significantly, ozone levels in the region
have also been a source of concern. As with TSP and carbon monoxide,
El Paso is a non-attainment area for ozone with levels of .17 ppm in 1989
compared to an EPA standard of .12. The rapid growth in VOC-intensive
production processes in Ciudad Juarez (electronics in particular, but also
furniture and automotive sectors) has exacerbated the situation. Even
though El Paso VOC emissions fell by 25 percent between 1980 and 1985,
ozone levels continued to rise. Conversely, emissions from the American
side of the border have also been a subject of concern. In particular, the
Asarco copper smelter in northwest El Paso and the nearby Chevron oil
refinery have been significant sources of binational pollution in the air
shed, generating large amounts of sulphur, nitrogen, arsenic, lead, zinc
and cadmium. 2
Like Ciudad Juarez-El Paso, Tijuana-San Diego share a common
airshed bisected by the international border and bounded by the ocean
to the west, the Santa Ana mountains to the north, the Laguna mountains
to the east and the Sierra Juarez to the south. There is a daily exchange
of air as winds blow from the west to east in the afternoon and evening
when air pressure is higher over the ocean and southeast to northwest
overnight when the land surface begins to cool. The circular flow covers
an area of 120 kilometres from north to south and 70 kilometres from
west to east, but is more pronounced in the summer months. In addition,
like Ciudad Juarez-El Paso the basin also tends to suffer from atmospheric inversions in the winter months, exacerbating air pollution problems.
Therefore, there is considerable diffusion of air pollution between the two
cities. In the case of Tijuana-San Diego, however, the air pollution

12. Bath & Rodriguez, supra note 11; Bath, Environmental Issues in the U.S.-Mexico

Borderlands, supra note 11; Bath, Health and Environmental Problens, supra note 11; USOTR,
supra note 10; Howard G. Applegate & Conrado Dfaz Q., Vehicles and Air Pollution in El
Paso-Ciudad Juarez, in EcoLOGfA Y FRONTERA 132-36 (Juan Alvarkz & Victor Castillo eds.,
1986); James W. Yarborough et al., The El Paso-Ciudad Juarez Air Quality Study (paper
presented at the Air and Waste Management Association National Meeting, June, 1990).
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problems are of a somewhat different nature since topographical and
meteorological conditions tend to favour San Diego relative to Tijuana.
Finally, as is the case with Ciudad Juarez-El Paso, the emissions from
either side have tended to reflect levels of development in the past but
are becoming increasingly similar. 3
Comprehensive monitoring of Tijuana emissions is only just
beginning. However, monitoring of Tijuana particulate concentrations
conducted by the SDAPCD and the SMA in 1980-81 revealed that
particulate levels in the city exceeded the EPA 24-hour standard (260
pg/m 3 ) in 79 percent of the samples taken. Due to meteorological
conditions these levels are only likely to affect the southwest part of San
Diego County. In addition to particulate matter emissions from unpaved
roads and residential waste incineration, other sources of concern include
carbon monoxide, nitrous oxide and hydrocarbon emissions from
vehicles, 4 sulfur dioxide, nitrous oxide and particulate matter emissions
from the Ternoelkctrica electricity generating station on the coast at
Rosario, and toxic and sulfur dioxide emissions from brick plants in the
Mesa de Otay. More recently, however, an increasing amount of concern
has revolved around the more general pattern of industrialization and the
lack of appropriate controls.'5
San Diego is a non-attainment zone for both carbon monoxide (10
ppm relative to the NAAQS of 9 ppm) and ozone (.19 ppm relative to
.12). In 1990 the city exceeded the state ozone standard (.09 ppm) on 139
separate occasions, and the less stringent federal standard on 39
occasions. Air pollutant transport from San Diego to Tijuana is probably
significant, particularly in the summer months when there is a stronger
north-south component in the local air circulation patterns. Diffusion,
however, is somewhat difficult to monitor since photochemical smog
formation may take as long as six hours. 6 In addition, both cities tend
13. Bath, Environnental Issues in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands, supra note 11; Enrique
Jauregui, Air Pollutant Transport in the Tijuana-San Diego Air Basin, (Jan. 1980) (paper
presented at the Second Conference on Coastal Meteorology of the American Meteorological
Society; Hal W. Brown et al., An Example of Border Cooperation: The Tijuana-San Diego
Air Quality Project, (April 1982) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the United
States-Mexico Border Health Association).
14. 85% of vehicles in Tijuana do not have emissions controls. See Juan Alvarez Lopez,
Contaninacion Atmosferica: Cuenca Tijuana-San Diego, in EcoLocfA Y FRONTERA 137-56 (Juan
Alvarez Lopez & Victor M. Castilla eds., 1986).
15. Memorandum from Hal W. Brown & Virginia Bigler-Engler, An Example of
International Cooperation: The Tijuana-San Diego Air Quality Project (1984); Joseph Nalven,
Social and Cultural Aspects of Trausborder Environmental Cooperation,2 MEXICAN STUD. 107 (1986); Joseph Nalven, Translyoundary Enviroinnental Problem Solving: Social Processes, Cultural
Perception,26 NAT. RESOURCES J.793 (1986); Alvarez Lopez, supra note 14; USOTR, supranote
10; EPA, supra note 10.
16. The chief meteorologist at the SDAPCD believes that much of the ozone arising from
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to suffer from Los Angeles emissions-in particular hydrocarbons, carbon
monoxide and nitrous oxides-when the so-called Santa Ana conditions
are weak and there is significant pollutant transport out over the ocean
and south into the air basin. Ozone levels in San Diego-Tijuana remained
more or less constant throughout the 1980's despite the considerable drop
in local VOC emissions. Overall, Los Angeles VOC emissions were
responsible for well over two-thirds of San Diego violations of EPA ozone
standards in 1991.7
TransfrontierDiffusion of Water Pollution
Although many of the binational problems associated with
surface water questions in the border region have been related to water
quantity, water quality issues have also been a source of some concern.
Responsibility, however, is somewhat easier to determine in the case of
surface water pollution relative to air pollution since it is easier to trace
the diffusion of pollutants. Perhaps, the single issue to which the most
attention has been paid in the past is related to the salinity of the
Colorado River when it crosses the international border and enters
Mexico. At its headwaters, the Colorado has a salinity concentration of
approximately 50 ppm, but dissolved solids from irrigation projects and
natural sources results in a level of 870 ppm by the time it reaches the
border. This is exacerbated by diversion projects which reduce the flow
of water, increasing concentrations of inorganic salts. Other sources of
tension have included copper tailings in the San Pedro River from the
smelter in Cananea, Sonora. These wastes affected agriculture and
wildlife downstream in Arizona until the late 1970s, when a diversionary
canal was created to reduce degradation. In addition, the 1979 Ixtoc oil-rig
spill in the Gulf of Mexico which caused damage to Texas beaches
created considerable binational concern. Without question, however, the
most significant binational water quality problems in the border region
are related to effluent in the major twin-cities. Although there is
significant diffusion from north to south - only 1 percent of the coloflias
which border the Rio Grande in Texas have sewer connections and until
the late 1980s Las Cruces, New Mexico dumped untreated sewage

San Diego hydrocarbon and VOC emission manifests itself in the desert southeast of Tecate.
(Personal communication from Hal Brown, SDAPCD.)
17. San Diego Air Pollution Control District, Air Quality Scorecard (1991) (SDAPDC
memo); USOTR, supra note 10; Jauregui, supra note 13; C. Richard Bath, United States-Mexico
Experience in Managing TransboundaryAir Resources: Problenms,Prospects,and Reconmnendations
for the Future, 22 NAT. RE5OURCES 1. 1147 (1982).
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directly into the Rio Grande most of the diffusion is from south to
north."8 Four particularly acute cases will be discussed.
The New River, which passes through Mexicali before crossing
the border at Calexico, California and flowing north through the Imperial
Valley and emptying into the Salton Sea, has been described as the most
polluted river in North America. Most of the waste originates in Mexicali,
with large volumes of untreated municipal sewage and industrial waste
discharged directly into the New River and indirectly into collector
system, being the prime culprits. The sewage treatment system in
Mexicali consists of three anaerobic ponds and 10 aereated ponds.
Designed to treat 750 litres per second, it was receiving 1,200 to 1,300 in
1989. Indeed, over 100 toxics have been detected in the river at the
border. Significantly, 13 of the 16 VOCs most commonly used in the
electronics sector were detected in the river in 1982. Water samples taken
by the Regional Water Quality Board in 1990 continued to show high
levels of many industrial chemicals. In addition, Nuevo Laredo,
Tamaulipas across the river from Laredo, Texas disgorges 24 mgd of
untreated sewage into the Rio Grande, resulting in significant degradation. While samples taken upstream have revealed concentrations in the
order of 200 fecal bacteria per 100 mls of water, downstream sample
concentrations have been as high as 22,000. Conversely, Laredo has two
sewage treatment plants, both in compliance with state and federal
standards. Given the industrial base of Nuevo Laredo's economy,
industrial pollutant concentrations arising from direct and indirect
discharges are probably also high. Such emissions affect both the quality
of water used in Laredo and other cities downstream as well as the
estuaries and coastal zones in the Lower Rio Grande as it empties into
the Gulf of Mexico. 9

18. Allen V. Kneese, Enviromnental Stress and Political Conflicts: Salinity it tile Colorado
River, 4 TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES REP. 1 (1990); Niles Hansen, Transboundary Environnental Issues in the U.S-Mexico Borderland, in INTEGRATED PHYSICAL, SOCiO-ECONOMIC AND

ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING 167-89 (Yusuf J. Ahmad & Frank G. Mueller eds., 1982); Bath,
Environmental Issues in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands, supra note 11; Mumme, supra note 10;
USOTR, supra note 10.
19. Hansen, supra note 18; USOTR, supra note 10; NATIONAL Toxics CAMPAIGN FUND
(NTCF), BORDER TROUBLE: RIVERS IN PERIL (1992);

International

Boundary Waters

Commission (IBWC), Tijuana Sanitation (1989) (IBWC Memo); Richard Alm & Bruce
Tomaso, Dirty Water: U.S. Must Live with Border Pollution or Aid Mexico's Cleanup, 4
TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES REP. 3 (1990); Bath, Environunental Issues in the U.S.-Mexico
Borderlands, supra note 11; Charles Metzner, Water Quality Issues of the San Diego-Tijuana
Border Region, 5 SAN DIEGO ST. U. BORDER ISSUES SERIES (1989); Diane M. Perry et al.,
Binational Management ofHazardous Waste: The Maquiladora Industry at the United States-Mexico
Border, 14 ENVTL. MGmT. 441 (1990).
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The situation in Ciudad Juarez-EI Paso is equally dire. Juarez, a
city of over 1.5 million, does not have any treatment facilities whatsoever.
Unfortunately, little data is available on the quality of the Rio Grande
downstream, however, bacterial and chemical pollution is thought to be
high and Juarez officials have reported traces of various heavy metals in

the collector system. In addition, a National Toxics Campaign Fund study
of effluent concentrations at various industrial sites in Juarez found
significant evidence of industrial pollution. And finally, the situation in
Tijuana-San Diego is, perhaps, the worst of any of the twin cities. In
terms of transborder effects it is important to remember that approximately 13 mgd of Tijuana's sewage is redirected to the treatment plant in
San Diego via an emergency connection. In addition, an estimated 12
mgd of raw domestic and industrial waste (direct discharges from plants,
runoff from residential neighborhoods, and leakages from collector
systems) is carried by the Tijuana River across the border and into the
estuary at the coast. And finally, effluent from the treatment plants
themselves affect the coastline. Indeed, many of San Diego's beaches have
been under quarantine since 1980. °

20. See NTCF, supra note 19; USOTR, supra note 10; EPA, supra note 10. The relative
contributions of sources on the two sides of the border to coastal degradation can be
documented with samples of effluent waste at the respective treatment plants:
Comparison of Tijuana and San Diego Treatment
Plant Effluent Waste Concentrations
Waste
BOD
TSS
Oil and Grease
Silver
Cadmium
Chromium
Mercury
Selenium
Lead
Nickel
Copper

San Diego
161
114
116
0.013
0.008
0.043
0.133
0.136
0.007
0.133

Tijuana-Ensenada
325
384
29.3
0.031
0.003
0.291
0,353
0.040
0.275
0.073
0.353

These would not, however, reflect percentage contributions to coastal degradation since San
Diego volumes are larger than Tijuana volumes. Conversely, since the Punta Bundera outfall
pipe is just off the beach while Point Loma's extends out into the ocean, a given volume and
concentration of effluent from Tijuana will have more significant coastal effects. See Jose A.
Segovia Zaval & Francisco Delgadillo Hinojosa, Diagnostico y Alternativias de Reduccion y
Control de la Disposicion de Aguas Residuales Sobre ta Zona Costera Fronteriza, in EcoLoGA Y
FRONTERA 236-44 (Juan Alvarez Lopez & Victor M. Castilla eds., 1986).
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TransfrontierDiffusion of Soil Pollution

The transfrontier diffusion of land-based pollution may appear
to be anachronistic in that the environmental medium, soil, is not subject
to diffusion in and of itself. However, there are two potential forms of
land-based transfrontier diffusion of wastes, particularly hazardous
wastes, in the border region. One form of diffusion of land-based
pollution arises from the illegal export and import of hazardous wastes
across the border. Most such diffusion is from north to south. For
instance, in 1981, 160 drums of toxic waste, including 42 drums of
polychlorinated biphenyls, were illegally dumped in Zacatecas. In another
case in 1986 SEDUE officials discovered 10,000 gallons of heavy hydrocarbons and other toxic wastes at an illegal dump near Tecate. The wastes
were traced to a hazardous waste management firm based in Long Beach,
California. In addition, a large number of drums containing toxic wastes
of unknown origin were found near Mexicali in 1992.21
There is also the potential for significant natural diffusion of
land-based transfrontier pollution. The diffusion arises from the seepage
of pollutants from landfill sites located in the recharge areas of cross-border aquifers and is particularly problematic in the border region since a
number of aquifers (Hueco Bolson, Mesilla Bolson, and others) cross the
border and can thus be contaminated from seepage on either side. These
water quality issues are exacerbated by withdrawal rates which exceed
the aquifer's recharge capacities, reducing water volumes and thus
increasing pollutant concentrations. In such cases transfrontier diffusion
would be in both directions. As testament to its potential significance, it
has been estimated that there are 9,000 hazardous waste sites in the
border region with 1,400 of these being uncontrolled. Discussions of
hazardous waste treatment and disposal practices in Mexico indicate that
there is significant potential for diffusion from south to north. Perhaps,
more ominous is the potential for the two diffusion processes to work in
concert. Thus, illegal exports of hazardous waste from the United States
to Mexico which are then dumped in inappropriate sites may, paradoxically, result in greater environmental degradation of American natural
resources than domestic treatment due to the potential for the contamination of transborder groundwater aquifers.'

21. See Mumme, supra note 10; Roberto Sanchez, Manejo transfronterizo de residuos tdxicos
y peligrosos: Una amenaza para los parses del tercer miludo, FRONTERA NORTE 91-114 (1990).
22. Ludwik A. Teclaff, Principlesfor TransboundaryGroundwaterPollution Control, 22 NAT.
REsouRcEs J.1065 (1982); Albert E. Utton, TransborderWater Quality: InstitutionalAlternatives,
in ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS AND BIORESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES--

MEXICO BORDERLANDS 49-61 (Paul Ganster & Hartmut Walter eds., 1990). See Mumne, supra
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III. THE EFFECT OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION ON
PRODUCTION COSTS IN THE BORDER REGION
Therefore, there is significant evidence of transfrontier diffusion
of pollution (in both directions) in the Border Region. Clearly this has
significant environmental repercussions. In order for such diffusion to have
significant economic effects, however, there must be a relationship between
the diffusion of pollution across the border and the relative production
costs on the two sides of the border. For instance, if both sides of the
border possessed regulatory regimes whereby pollution permits were
issued on the basis of ambient pollutant concentrations the diffusion of
pollution would push down permit costs in the upstream country and
increase their costs in the downstream country. However, such a regime
is an ideal to which neither side of the border subscribes. Therefore, a
more detailed empirical analysis of the cost effects of transfrontier
pollution in the border region is required. In general, it would appear
that whereas the transfrontier diffusion of pollution from north to south
certainly affects the Mexican environment, it does not affect production
costs for plants located in Mexico to the same extent that diffusion from
the United States to Mexico affects production costs for plants located in
the United States. Three cases will be analyzed: the financing of
binational sewage facilities, expenses for water treatment facilities, and
air pollution abatement costs.
FinancingBinational Sewage Facilities
As noted above, much of the wastewater collected in Tijuana is
conveyed via an emergency connection for treatment on the American
side of the border at the San Diego treatment plant. In addition, in an
attempt to reduce transfrontier flows of wastewater Inter-American
Development Bank funds have been made available for the improvement
of collection systems. Although there are financial arrangements whereby
Mexico pays compensation to San Diego for the use of such facilities the
extent to which it does so has not historically been in line with the actual
costs incurred. It should be emphasized, however, that a partial subsidy
must be considered legitimate since there is little basis upon which to
expect Mexican authorities to treat waste bound for the United States to
a higher degree than waste which remains in the country. According to
the Office of the United States Trade Representative the quantity of such
waste treated in the United States reached 13 million gpd by the

note 10; Aim & Tomaso, supra note 19; L. KOCHAN, THE MAQUILADORAS AND Toxics: THE
HIDDEN COSTS OF PRODUCTION SOUTH OF THE BORDER (1990).
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mid-1980s. Thus, cumulative payments of less than $2 million over the
course of three decades have not covered the real cost for the use of the
facility. For purposes of comparison it is interesting to note that a number
of "participating agencies" within San Diego County also use the Point
Loma treatment facilities but are not themselves directly responsible for
financing the metropolitan sewage system. In the late 1980's such
participating agencies paid approximately $15 million per year to the City
of San Diego (City of San Diego Water Utilities Department 1988), while
average wastewater flows from participating agencies was 50 million gpd
(City of San Diego Water Utilities Department 1992). Thus, at equivalent
rates Tijuana would have to pay approximately $4 million dollars per
year. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the subsidy received by Tijuana
users of the Point Loma Treatment plant is quite significant.23
The city threatened to increase treatment fees for transfrontier
wastewater from $520/day to $5,000/day in 1985 and later threatened to
discontinue treatment of such waste unless it received reimbursement
from the federal government for expenses incurred.' To some extent,
the same is true of the payments for the use of the emergency connection
and Point Loma treatment plant. For instance, the $90 million IADB loan
for investment in Tijuana's sewage collection system only covers the
operating costs of the collection system, with the capital costs being paid
by the IBWC. Although the IBWC is financed by the federal governments
in both countries, it remains true that the Mexican collection system is
financed, in large part, by American taxpayers. This transnational subsidy
is likely to continue to be the case for the foreseeable future, as is
documented by the proposed budget for the new $400 million binational
IBWC treatment plant:
Table 1:
Proposed Allocation of Capital Costs for IBWC Planes
U.S. Government
California
San Diego
Mexico Government

$208.0
$ 31.6
$ 75.2
$ 85.2

million
million
million
million

23. Comite de Planeacion Para el Desarrollo Urbano (C.OPLADU), PLAN MUNICIPAL DE
DESARROLLO DE TIJUANA (1990); USOTR, supra note 10; SAN DIEGO WATER UTILITIES
DEPARTMENT, FISCAL YEAR OVERVIEW-1992 (1992); SAN DIEGO WATER UTILITIES DEPART-

MENT, ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT-1988 (1989).
24. Stephen P. Mumme &Joseph Nalven, NationalPerspectiveson ManagingTransboundary
Environmental Hazards: The U.S.-Mexico Border Region, 3 J. BORDERLANDS STUD. 39 (1988).
25. The total cost ($400 million) was obtained from the EPA (supra note 10), while the
proportion of such expenditures attributable to different jurisdictions was obtained from the
IBWC (supra note 9).
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Considering that the plant is designed in large part to deal with Tijuana
wastewater it is evident that industrial users located in Tijuana will be
receiving an effective subsidy. To the extent that users on the American
side of the border generate the revenue from which the responsible
agencies are financed, such costs will be borne by firms located in the
United States.
Binational arrangements for sewer financing elsewhere in the
border region have also followed this pattern. For instance, financing for
the new $44 million Nuevo Laredo wastewater collection and treatment
facility is to be borne by the United States Government, the State of Texas
and the city of Laredo on the United States side of the border, while on
the Mexican side of the border only the federal government is responsible
for financing. Capital costs for the original Nogales, Sonora-Nogales,
Arizona binational treatment facility were borne on the American side
with part of the operation and maintenance costs paid, according to
volumes discharged, by Mexico. In addition, the $13 million expansion
of the binational facility is to be funded at all three levels of government
in the United States but only at the federal level in Mexico. In the face of
such arrangements it is clear that industrial users located in Mexico
receive a subsidy from users on the American side of the border with
respect to binational treatment facilities. There are, of course, numerous
other environmental subsidies which users on both sides of the border
obtain, the distinction in this case is that the subsidy pertains directly to
a transnational environmental externality. Paradoxically, this would
indicate that American firms manufacturing (or subcontracting from
Mexican firms) in Mexican border areas receive a subsidy from the
federal tax base in the United States which is not available to firms
manufacturing in the United States since the EPA, and not the municipality or the state, is supposed to pay for those costs associated with
wastewater flows originating from outside national territory.26
Water Treatment Costs
There are also significant costs borne by industrial firms in
regions which receive their process water from treatment facilities which
draw iheir water from transnational surface waters. In effect, whereas the
case of sewage collection and treatment discussed above represents a
form of transnational financial externalization, incremental water
treatment costs represent an instance of transnational technological
26. See EPA, supra note 10; Jose L. Calder6n Barthemeuf, Policies and Strategies for the
Control of Contaminationof Water on the Northern Mexican Border, in ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS
AND BIORESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO BORDERLANDS 31-47 (Paul
Ganster & Hartmut Walter eds., 1990).
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externalization. To understand how this affects production costs it is
necessary to realize that under the regulatory framework of the Safe
Drinking Water Act (194), the EPA must set Maximum Contaminant
Levels (MCLs) which represent binding standards-including a margin
of safety against adverse health effects - for concentrations of a variety of
contaminants in drinking water. The Act was amended in 1986, and 83
new drinking standards were passed within three years. Since the
regulations are pollutant-based instead of technology-based, water
treatment costs (for all users) rise with source water pollution levels as
more comprehensive treatment levels are required. Thus, industrial users
will have to pay more for water charges unless they source their water
directly from surface or groundwaters. Moreover, even if they do not
source their water from the public system, they will be forced to
undertake more comprehensive treatment as water quality deteriorates.
Instances of increased treatment costs due to transfrontier
pollution are more common in the section of the border on the Rio
Grande since communities on the western section of the border (principally Tijuana-San Diego and Mexicali-Calexico) draw most of their water
from higher up on the Colorado River in the United States, while 98
percent of residents of the Lower Rio Grande draw their water from the
binational river. Although samples taken as recently as 1981 indicated
that water quality in the Rio Grande was deemed to be satisfactory, the
quality appears to have deteriorated significantly in recent years.
Laredo/Nuevo Laredo is such a case. In the face of increased emissions
of untreated wastewater from Nuevo Laredo, the quality of the Rio
Grande declined, resulting in higher water treatment costs. To the extent
that industrial users pay higher water rates as a result they are paying for
the transfrontier diffusion of pollution.' The same would be true of
other cities lower down the river which are adversely affected by
untreated effluent discharges. For instance, the community of Rio Bravo,
Texas has been forced to upgrade its water treatment facilities in the face
of an increasingly polluted Rio Grande. The International Falcon
Reservoir which provides drinking water for 1.5 million people has also
been adversely affected. Ciudad Juarez-El Paso does not draw its water
from the Rio Grande, but from the Hueco Bolson aquifer. Consequently,
water treatment costs are not affected by emissions into the river.
However, extra costs for treatment of water drawn from the aquifer may

27. As the chief of environmental health for the Laredo-Webb County Health Department
stated: 'The more polluted the river, the more it costs us to put out safe water. If we have
a very polluted river, we will have an expensive water treatment plant to run." See Aim and
Tomaso, supra note 19.
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prove to be costly in the near future. Moreover, Juarez wastewater
2
emissions already affect the costs of water treatment downstream .
Air Pollution Abatement Costs
The last case to be discussed involves the extra production costs
associated with the transnational nature of air pollutants in the border
region. The particular case of ozone levels in Ciudad Juarez-El Paso will
be discussed since it is particularly acute. However, the insights are true
of the diffusion of other pollutants in other cities along the border as
well. As noted, El Paso is a non-attainment zone for ozone, with 1989
levels of .17 ppm in comparison to the federal and state standard of .12
ppm. Indeed the city has been a non-attainment zone with respect to
ozone since the 1970's. However, in recent years total emission levels
have fallen. Between 1980 and 1985 there was a 25 percent fall in El Paso
emissions. This is due in part to the installation of the most effective air
pollution
control devices legislated by the EPA for industrial point sourc29
es.
Nonetheless, due to emissions from Juarez, ozone levels remain
above EPA standards. Effectively El Paso is faced with a dilemma in
terms of the appropriate treatment of Juarez emissions in abatement
plans. For instance, the 1979 and 1985 State Implementation Plans for El
Paso air pollution did not include Juarez emissions in the plan. The result
was that the state required unrealistically low control levels and as a
consequence the EPA rejected the Texas SIP's for the city. However, if
Juarez emissions are taken into account, unduly stringent control levels
would be required for industrial sources in El Paso. Indeed it is possible
that El Paso would not meet EPA ozone standards even if emissions were
reduced to zero. Therefore, to the extent that Juarez emissions are
responsible for El Paso's non-attainment status, industrial sources of
VOC's in El Paso must undertake significant expenditures on pollution
control technology as a consequence of the transfrontier diffusion of air
pollution. Moreover, under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
zones for ozone must undertake the following meanon-attainment
3
sures: 0
1) VOC emissions must be reduced by 3 percent/year
after the first six years of the programme until the
NAAQS is attained.

28. See NTCF, supra note 19; Aim and Tomaso, supra note 19; Utton, supra note 22.
29. See USOTR, supra note 10; Yarborough et al., supra note 11,
30. See USOTR, supra note 10.
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Existing stationary sources with emissions in excess
of 50 tons/year must install Reasonably Available
Control Technology (RACT).
The city must introduce a construction permit programme for new stationary sources which requires
the Lowest Achievable Emissions Rate (LAER) and
offsetting reductions in emissions from other sources
of 1.2:1.

In addition, since many significant industrial VOC sources also emit some
of the 189 toxic air pollutants listed in the CAAA, they will also have to
install the Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) for such
pollutants. Considering the capital costs of abatement equipment for
VOCs and toxic air pollutants (carbon absorbers, thermal incinerators and
acid/alkali scrubbers), such regulations are likely to be quite burdensome. In 1990 the 357 firms in the SIC 36 sector in the state with more
than 20 employees spent $3.9 million on capital costs related to VOC
abatement." This comes to approximately $10,900 per firm.
IV. THE THEORY OF BINATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION
The discussion thus far assumes that there is no international
cooperation to resolve the sorts of binational environmental problems
which exist in the border region. That is to say, it assumes that the only
way in which a country can improve its environmental quality is to
restrict emissions within its own borders and that it continues to do so
even if doing so proves to be ineffective. Is this a realistic assumption for
the border region? Although there has, in fact, been significant progress
on binational environmental problems in terms of institutional agreements (i.e. the IBWC, the La Paz Agreement, the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, etc...), this has not been fully
translated into practical solutions to some of the more intractable
problems associated with hazardous waste. In order to understand why
this has been the case it is necessary to look at the theoretical literature
on transfrontier pollution and cooperative solutions.
In effect, negotiations of controls for transfrontier pollution are
more similar to private bargaining situations than to the national setting
of environmental controls. In the international case, however, the
bargaining agents are states instead of individuals. In both cases, the
agreement struck must be satisfactory to all participants without
compulsion since there is no authority in a position to compel compli-

31. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE (USDOC), COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS-TEXAS tbl. lb (1991);

U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, POLLUTION ABATEMENT AND CONTROL EXPENDITURES tbl. 3b (1992).
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ance. Consequently, in many senses the case of a transfrontier pollution
problem possesses characteristics similar to an ordinary problem of
externalities amongst individuals, and thus one would expect that a
Coasean solution could be achieved, wherein Pareto optimality emerges
regardless of property right allocation. There is, however, one important
distinction between the two cases which must be noted. In international
questions one cannot assume a given legal regime. Indeed the regime
itself is subject to negotiation. The essential point is that a Coasean
solution assumes a given system of property rights and merely asserts
that what precisely this system constitutes is irrelevant in terms of
allocative efficiency. In the international case, however, since one can not
assume a definite system of property rights of any sort there is no reason
to expect an efficient solution to arise spontaneously through bargaining.
Although in theory the principle of non-discrimination would
seem to imply that the polluter-pays-principle applies to international
questions and consequently that the affected party possesses a "right" to
a clean environment, in practice this is by no means self-evident. For
instance, in the ruling it was asserted that it is unlawful for a state to
cause transfrontier pollution which entails serious damage in another
state. However, precisely what is perceived to constitute "serious damage"
may differ between states. If a downstream country is unwilling to
tolerate levels of pollution which are deemed acceptable by the upstream
country within its own borders does this constitute serious damage?
Moreover, in recent years the principle of non-discrimination has been
extended to include the notion of "risk creation of serious damage."
However, there is much scope for ambiguity in this notion in terms of
both uncertainty about the degree of probability of the damage and the
seriousness of the damage itself. 2 Risk is a fundamentally contextual
term. Consequently, there are no general principles which can be
universally applied in order to determine the "rights" of states to a clean
environment on the one hand or to pollute the environment on the other.
In this light, the use of international financial transfers (IFT's) has been
advocated as a means to resolve such problems.' IFT's enable a downstream country to obtain what it perceives to be an efficient solution to
a transfrontier problem in a manner that is perceived to be equitable by
the upstream country. These transfers are, however, merely the outcome

32. For discussions of the economic and legal implications of transfrontier pollution, see
OECD, Transfrontier Pollution and the Role of States (1981).
33. In a sense, other forms of compensation--debt-for-nature swaps, environmental
project lending, and loans tied to environmental improvement-are all specific forms of the
more general notion of IFTs. For a discussion, see Peter Nunnenkamp, International
Financing of Environmental Protection, Kiel Working Paper No. 512 (1992).
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of negotiations and as such must be analyzed in a game-theoretical
framework.
Let it be assumed that there is a unidirectional transfrontier
externality from Mexico to the United States. Let it also be assumed that
the total cost function C(A) of abatement in the emitting country (Mexico)
is upward-sloping (i.e. C'(A) > 0) and that the marginal cost of abatement
is also increasing (i.e. C"(A) > 0). The binational benefit function of
abatement B(A) is also increasing (B'(A) > 0), but it will be assumed that
the marginal benefit is decreasing (i.e. (B"(A) < 0).' Given the existence
of TFP, the benefit function can be split into two parts, with one part
referring to the pollution which remains in Mexico, and the other part
referring to the pollution which is diffused across the border into the
United States.
Figure 1:
Transfrontier Pollution and Environmental Cooperation

Marginal
Cost and
Benefit

Au

Ae

In the figure MB.c = MBMx + MBus. Let ct be the proportion of benefits
of abatement (cost of damages arising from emissions) for the United
States. As such,
MBMx

(1 - a) MBTOT

MBus = a MBTOT
34. These are standard assumptions in the literature. They are not, however, necessary
assumptions. All that is required for the analysis to be valid is that the marginal cost of
abatement at the unilateral equilibrium is less than the binational marginal benefit.
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a will be a function of the rate of diffusion and the relative valuation of
damages." MCMx is simply the marginal cost of abatement. Unilaterally,
Mexico will choose a level of abatement Au since at this point it will
equate its own marginal benefit and marginal cost curves. This is not,
however, the efficient binational optimum, which would be achieved at
AE, where the total marginal benefit of abatement to the two countries is
equated with the emitting country's marginal cost of abatement. In order
to determine where the two countries will end up as a result of a
negotiated solution to the transfrontier externality, the negotiations can
be presented as a non-cooperative game.*
Let it be assumed that both abatement and damage functions are
known and that there are no transaction costs. The downstream country
offers the upstream country a payment (Ous) if it agrees to abate
pollution by a given amount (Avs). Similarly, the upstream country offers
to abate pollution by a given amount (AMx) if it receives a payment (OMx)
from the downstream country. The net benefit for Mexico for a given
offer (A*, O*) is:
NBMx = (1 - a) B (A* - Au) + 0* - C(A* - Au).

And the net benefit for the United States is:
NBus = aB (A* - Au) - 0*.

As long as the two offers are compatible there will be an agreement. That
is to say, as long as the offer from the downstream country is as good for
the upstream country as its own offer, or as long as the offer from the
upstream country is as good from downstream country as its own offer,
an agreement will be reached. Consequently the feasible set of all
agreements will be:
1(O*, S*); a B (A* - Au) > 0* > C (A* - A u) - (1 - a) B (A* - Au)).

In this set, the benefits of additional abatement to the United Sates are
greater than the bid, which in turn, is greater than the costs of additional
abatement to Mexico minus its own benefits of additional abatement.
The feasible set of equilibria, however, is infinite. Where,
precisely, this solution will lie depends upon the respective bargaining

35. For instance, if 50% of emissions are diffused across the border, assimilative capacity
is the same on both sides of the border, but the United States values damages twice as
highly as Mexico, a will equal .667.
36. Karl-Goran MAler, InternationalEnvironmental Problems, 6 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y
80 (1990).
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powers of the two countries. Therefore, in a one-shot game the agreement
could lie anywhere in the shaded area bounded by the MBTOT curve and
the MCMx curve, to the right of Au and to the left of AE. In every
equilibria the negotiated solution will involve a level of abatement that
is lower than had been the case in the optimal solution. The Coase
Theorem does not hold since property rights can not be explicitly
determined in international situations. However, there will be a tendency
toward the efficient equilibrium in a model involving repeated games.
The solution of each consecutive game will represent a movement toward
the optimal solution.'
V. BINATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION IN THE
BORDER REGION AND CONTINUED ENVIRONMENTAL
DEGRADATION
Game theory enables us to present the nature of the problem of
binational cooperation in the presence of a transfrontier externality, but
it does not enable us to analyze the reality of a given incidence of such
an externality. In this section, the reasons why, despite the magnitude of
the benefits available, the two countries have thus far been unable to
address the problem of environmental degradation are discussed. In a
general sense, three elements have been cited as impeding transboundary
environmental cooperation in the border region: The ambivalence of both
sides toward concessionary aid from the United States; Mexico's inability
to participate in cooperative agreements to the same extent as the United
States; and, Mexico's desire to engage in independent action. Although,
it is possible that the latter point can be understood as primarily the
consequence of cultural and social factors, it is asserted that most aspects
of the relationship are influenced by national differences in the level of
economic development and relationships of dependency.' Nonetheless,
as will be shown there has been significant cooperation with respect to

37. Henry Thulkens, Theoretical Foundations of Negotiations and Cost Sharing in
Transfrontier Pollution Problems (Sept. 1991) (paper presented at the Sixth Annual Congress
of the European Economic Association).
38. See Mumme, supra note 10; Nalven, Social and CulturalAspects of Transborder Environmental Cooperation, supra note 15; Bath, Environmental Issues in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands,
supra note 11; Mumme & Nalven, supra note 25; Bath & Rodriguez, supra note 11; Nalven,
Transboundary EnvironmentalProblem Solving, supra note 15. A good case study of the relative
importance of such factors is the case of SDAPCD-SMA cooperation on Tijuana air pollution
from 1979-1984. In one instance, the SMA refused the loan of gaseous pollution monitoring
equipment from the SDAPCD for related reasons. However, officials involved put much of
the blame for the cooperative agreement's demise on differences in degrees of political
centralization in the two countries. See Alvarez Lopez, supra note 14; Brown & Bigler-Engler,
supra note 15; Brown et a)., supra note 13.
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the environment. Therefore, it will be argued that continued environmental degradation arises not so much from a lack of cooperation but from
the very nature of cooperation, which, in turn, is a consequence of the
nature of production in the border region. To see why this is so it is
necessary to analyze the nature of cooperation which presently exists (i.e..
the IBWC, the Joint Marine Contingency Plan, the La Paz Agreement, the
Integrated Border Environment Plan etc...) in the border region.
Binational Environmental Cooperationin the Border Region
Originally signed in 1944 the binational IBWC was designed to
deal with sanitation and sewage issues in the border region. However,
with the passage of time more general water pollution problems were
included in its mandate, particularly following the passage of Minute 261
in 1979. Amongst the other more important agreements, Minute 242
(1973) addressed the problem of salinity in the Colorado while Minute
264 (1980) addressed the problem of domestic sewage and industrial
waste in the New River. Despite the aspirations of some observers, the
IBWC has never become involved in environmental matters related to
media other thanwater, or indeed, even groundwater. 39
Under Minute 242, the United States agreed to the construction
of a desalination plant at Yuma, Arizona before the river crosses the
border. Although, presented as necessary due to international IBWC
obligations, the plant was also built to serve the Wellton-Mohawk
irrigation project which serves Imperial Valley, California. Moreover,
salinity in the river remains excessive, partly due to reduced flow as the
cities of the South-West draw an increasing volume of water from the
river. Similarly, although Mexico has made significant progress with
respect to pollution in the New River under Minute 264, it remains one
of the most polluted rivers in North America. And finally, binational
sewage-related work carried out elsewhere in the Border Region-particularly Nogales/Nogales and Laredo/Nuevo Laredo-under Minute 261
has met with qualified success.4"
Signed in 1983, the Border Environment Cooperation Agreement
(the La Paz Agreement) has constituted one of the most comprehensive

39. Stephen P. Mumme, La Paz Agreement: Progress and Problems in Managing the Border
Environment, 2 TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES REP. 1 (1988). See Mumme & Nalven, supra note
24; Utton, supra note 22; Albert E. Utton, Shared Water Resources in the United States-Mexico
Border Region, in ECOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE BORDER REGION 167-81 (Stanley R.

Ross ed., 1983).
40. See Utton, supra note 22; Stephen P. Mumme, International Boundary Water Commission,
1 TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES REP, 1 (1987); Metzner, supra note 19; Kneese, supra note 18;
Maler, supra note 35.
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efforts to resolve transnational pollution questions. Broken up into
separate working groups and with the heads of the EPA and SEDUE/SEDESOL as national coordinators, it has passed a number of Annexes
dealing with specific border region environmental problems. Annex I
(1985) is concerned with the problem of raw sewage being dumped into
the Tijuana River. Although the problem has not been resolved, loans for
improved collection systems and the binational plant to be constructed
at South Bay represent an important contribution. Annex II (1986)
authorized the creation of an Inland Joint Response Team to respond to
accidental oil spills and hazardous waste incidents in the border region.
The JRT has conducted several training and response exercises and
responded effectively to a potentially dangerous spill in El Paso 1990.
Annex III (1986), which became the model for the international Basel
Convention, established manifest and notification procedures for the
transport of hazardous waste across the border. Although there is some
debate about its effectiveness, there is little question that Annex III has
improved coordination between customs officials on the two sides of the
border. Annex IV (1987) addressed the problem of S02 emissions from
copper smelters in the "Grey Triangle." Under the Annex the EPA
revoked Phelps Dodge's request for a Clean Air Act waiver and SEDUE
required that the Nacozari plant install pollution control devices. And
finally, Annex V (1989), provides for an assessment of air quality
problems in the twin-city areas of the border region. Under the agreement expanded binational monitoring programmes are in place in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexicali and Tijuana and emissions inventories are being
undertaken in Tijuana and Juarez."
Many of the initiatives of the IBWC and the La Paz Agreement
have now been incorporated into the Integrated Border Environment
Plan. The Plan's first stage (1992-94) involves the following four main
objectives: Strengthening enforcement of existing laws; Reducing
pollution through new initiatives; Increasing cooperative planning,
training, and education, and; Improving understanding of the border
environment. Cooperative efforts will be further strengthened in the
second stage (1995-2000). The combined EPA-SEDUE budget for 1992 was
$326 million. Overall SEDUE has agreed to spend $460 million during the
first stage, $220 million of which is for sewer systems. EPA has not
released proposals for all three years, however for 1993, the total was
$179 million, with an additional $60 million from other agencies. 42

41. See Mumme, supra note 38; EPA, supra note 10; Mumme & Nalven, supra note 24;
USOTR, supra note 10.
42. See EPA, supra note 10.
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Perhaps most significantly, the plan makes provisions for an
additional 100 SEDUE/SEDESOL inspectors on the Mexican side of the
border, doubling the total. In addition, improved enforcement cooperation and information exchange across the border has been established.
New and improved wastewater collection system and treatment plants
have been proposed for the Nogales Wash, Tijuana-San Diego, Nuevo
Laredo-Laredo, Matamoros, Reynosa, Piedras Negras, Ciudad Juarez,
Mexicali and the coloilias of Texas. Most significantly, there will be
cooperation in the establishment of industrial wastewater pretreatment
programmes in cities which use the binationally-funded plants. With
respect to solid waste, $25 million will be invested in new landfills, and
there will be improved cooperation to detect illegal hazardous waste
shipments and monitor treatment. Some of the problems associated with
air pollution will be addressed through increased paving of roads and
better transportation facilities. It is hoped that comprehensive binational
air pollution control strategies for TJ-SD, Mexicali-Calexico and Juarez-EI
Paso will be in place by 1994.'
Finally, the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation signed between the governments of Canada, the United State
and Mexico represents a more general form of environmental cooperation. A Commission for Environmental Cooperation was set up,
comprising a cabinet-level Council, a permanent Secretariat, and a Joint
Public Advisory Committee. The commission is to address questions such
as environmental protection and trade distortions, the economic efficiency
of environmental measures, administrative transparency and public
participation, and international cooperation in developing measures and
enforcing them. Although scope of the Agreement extends far beyond the
Border Region, as part of the North American Free Trade Agreement the
agreement will certainly possess significant influence.
CooperativeAgreements as Contributors to Continued Environmental
Degradation
From the preceding discussion it is apparent that the United
States and Mexico have undertaken significant cooperative efforts to
resolve binational environmental problems in the border region.
However, the region remains exceptionally polluted. In order to
understand why this is so it is necessary to analyze the nature of the
cooperative agreements and place them in the context of a region wherein
there is significant interdependence of environmentally-determined
comparative advantage and transfrontier diffusion of pollution.

43. See EPA, supra note 10; USOTR, supra note 10.
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Game theoretical analyses assume, as noted, that states are
sovereign agents, representing the interests of their citizens. Thus, the
analysis of negotiated solutions to international problems assumes,
implicitly, that the interests of citizens within a given political jurisdiction
are complementary. For instance, in the case of water-based transfrontier
diffusion of pollution, citizens in the recipient country are affected as
residents (the degradation of water quality), taxpayers (sewer and water
costs), and producers (reduced natural capital). All agents possess an
interest in ensuring that the government negotiates for a solution wherein
the transfrontier diffusion of pollution is reduced. This may, however, be
circumscribed to the extent that negotiations involve instances wherein
one example of transfrontier pollution is linked with another, seemingly
unrelated, case." Agents who are adversely affected by negotiated
solutions to transfrontier pollution arising from their own emissions will
have rather more complex interests, and binational solutions will be
correspondingly more involved. However, such cases are merely
instances of political linkage related to negotiating strategies. In the
United State-Mexico Border Region, more fundamental economic linkages
are of greater interest.
As noted, the economy of the Border Region is characterized by
relations of close economic interdependence. Much of this involves
vertically-integrated production-sharing arrangements within individual
firms, particularly for those firms involved in the Border Industrialization
Program. 45 In the instance where firms have production locations on
both sides of the border--or, are in a position to exploit sub-contractual
or shelter arrangements from suppliers on the opposite side of the border-the interests of producers are not strictly complementary with those
of other agents in the economy. Assuming that 3 represents the proportion of production in the Mexican Border Region which is associated with
American capital the "national" marginal costs of abatement of production
located in the United States and Mexico can be represented as,

44. See Miler, supra note 35. Such cases arise frequently in the Border Region. For
instance, Mexico linked negotiations over compensation for the Ixtoc spill with the question
of Colorado River salinity. See Hansen, supra note 18.
45. See supra note 6.
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MCus = 0 MCToT'
MCMX = (1 -

B) MCMT

In this case the net benefit for the United States for a given offer (A*, O*)
is:
NBus = aB (A* - Au) - 0* - 1BC (A* - Au)
And the net benefit for Mexico for a given offer is:
NBMx = (1 - a) B (A* - Au ) + 0* - (1 - B) C (A* - Au).
The feasible set of all agreements will be:

((O*, S*); a B (A* - Au) - B3
C (A* - Au) > 0* > (1 - B) C (A* - Au)
- (0- a) B (A* - A).
The optimal level of abatement remains the same. However, in this case
the United States would be more willing to accept relatively lower levels
of abatement since American capital will (directly or indirectly) pay for
part of such abatement. Conversely, Mexico would be more willing to
undertake higher levels of abatement for the same reason. Thus, the
outcome of negotiations over conditions of production in Mexico with
respect to the environment depends upon the relative power of American
capital with links to production sites in Mexico and the Mexican state. If
production costs in Mexico are a significant factor in the viability of many
American firms and/or the Mexican state values the viability of the BIP
relatively more than environmental quality a negotiated solution which
involves relatively lower levels of abatement is more likely than would
otherwise be the case.

46. Given the rather convoluted nature of production-sharing arrangements in the region
(subsidiaries, sub-contractors, shelter programmes, et cetera) and the multiplicity of
objectives pursued by the respective governments with respect to the BIP (employment
creation, firm profitability, et cetera) such a crude distinction is, in some sense, invalid.
However, if the magnitude of 9 is understood as an index of the inverse of the relative
benefits derived from the existence of low production costs on the Mexican side of the
border rather than the incidence of abatement costs per se, the use of such a coefficient is not
entirely without justification.
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Cooperative Agreements as Contributorsto Continued Environmental
Degradation
In a closely related sense, even if the agreement reached involves
an efficient level of environmental degradation in a static sense, it may
not be tenable if it does not institute appropriate incentives. Thus, it is
important to distinguish between cooperative agreements which
constitute ex post attempts to "clean up" the environment and ex ante
attempts to attach an appropriate price to its use. In other words, the
means by which degradation is reduced in the emitting country is of
paramount importance. For instance, if the reduction in TFP is achieved
through the establishment of a comprehensive industrial wastewater
pretreatment programme the responsible agent will bear significant costs.
Conversely, if such flows are reduced through state investment in
POTWs and collection systems financed by Mexico City and Washington
D.C., then the responsible agent will bear little of the cost of reduced
flows. In certain instances the latter case may actually increase use of
environmental resources since firms are not adversely affected by
environmental degradation and nor do they pay for its use as a factor of
production. Thus, productivity in pollution-intensive sectors will increase.
For instance, sectors which have significant levels of water intake and
wastewater discharge will be relatively more viable than if no cooperative
agreement had been reached.
Which of the two poles do existing solutions more closely
resemble? Clearly some cooperative solutions adhere to the polluter-pays-principle more closely (Annex IV of the La Paz Agreement) than others
(Minute 242 of the IBWC). However, in general, the cost of cooperative
solutions tends to have been borne at the national level, not affecting
costs of production significantly. Agreements related to sanitation and
sewer issues constitute the most striking example. This is, to some extent,
inevitable. Most such resolutions are concerned primarily with efforts to
resolve public health related problems. Given the nagnitude of health
problems associated with uncollected and untreated sewage in the region,
such aid is both necessary and desirable. However, such aid should not
simultaneously generate environment-related production subsidies,
particularly since much of the subsidy is obtained, directly or indirectly,
by American producers. Not only will this prove to be inequitable
(American firms in Mexico will receive a subsidy which is not available
to firms in the United States) but also inefficient (Mexico will continue to
possess a comparative advantage in waste-intensive production and the
region's environment will continue to suffer degradation). Ideally, the
perfect solution for regions which share a single ecosystem rests with
cooperative agreements which make the border irrelevant in terms of
environment-related costs of production. Transnational bubbles have been
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recommended as such a solution for binational pollution in common air
sheds in the region." However, such solutions are only efficient for
pollutants with predictable and localized effects. For instance, with
respect to ozone, Tijuana-San Diego share an air shed with Los Angeles,
but only occasionally and irregularly. Moreover, given the very different
legal status of the environment in the two countries (state ownership
versus common ownership), such solutions may prove to be politically
infeasible. Nonetheless, there are components of the IBEP which are
encouraging in that they recognize more fully the necessity for adherence
to the polluter-pays-principle (PPP) with respect to industrial transfrontier pollution effluent and emissions.
Most significantly, the implementation (with the EPA's financial
and technical support) of an industrial wastewater pretreatment
programme is encouraging. In terms of POTW costs, the agreement by
Ciudad Juarez maquiladoras to cover 30 percent of capital costs for the
new sewer system stands in marked contrast to the response to proposals
for a 5 percent infrastructure tax in the 1980s. In addition, the development of a proper air pollutant emissions' inventory and the establishment
of a comprehensive air pollution control programme by the end of 1994
should represent a movement toward greater internalization of environment-related production costs. Moreover, better hazardous waste manifest
and tracking procedures should reduce the possibility of illegal disposal
and thus increase the costs of treatment for firms which are presently
taking advantage of lax enforcement. And finally, private sector
participation in the creation of the proposed $20 billion North American
Development Bank for the financing of infrastructure projects should also
result in greater internalization of transboundary pollution externalities.

47. Howard G. Applegate, A Discussion of United States-Mexican Experience in Managing

TransboundaryAir Resources: Problems, prospects, and Recommendations for the Future, 22 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 1169 (1982); Applegate, supra note 10; Mumme & Nalven, supra note 24.

